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INTRODUCTION TO SOFTWARE SAFETY
• What is Software Safety?
• What is its relationship to other software qualities?
Real-Time Safety-Critical Systems
When computers are used to control complex,
mechanical devices or physical processes such as:
time-critical
Air Traffic
Nuclear Fission
Hospital Patient Monitoring
Defense and Aerospace Systems
where a run-time error or failure can result in death, injury, loss of
property, environmental harm.
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Facts about accidents:
Most accidents originate in system interfaces. Caused by com-
plex, unplanned interactions between components of the system.
• Accidents often involve multiple failures of different components.
System accidents intimately intertwined with comple_ty and
coupling.
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Goals in building complex systems:
• attaining mission (functional correctness)
• preventing undesired events while attempting to achieve
the mission (safety, security)
• minimizing cost
Focusing on safety separately from other goals:
• Allows for conflict resolution and decisions about
tradeoffs
• Allows differential handling of erroneous states
• Provides discipline and procedures for looking for errors
• Focuses attention and assigns responsibility
• Allows measuring a_nd ensuring safety separately from
other goals
Implications and Challenges for Software Engineering
Requirements for software safety analysis and verification being
included in contracts and by government licensing agencies.
• New standards for safety-critical software.
• Natronal and international working groups
Safety involves multiple areas of traditional software research
along with safety engineering.
reliability
security
?
SYSTEM RELIABILITY: considers problems concerned with
ensuring system will perform a required task or mission for a specified
time in a specified environment.
SYSTEM SAFETY: considers problems ofnot causing an accident
in the process.
• Usually many system failures which can occur without causing
a mishap
• Sometimes even conflicts between functional and safety
requirements
Relationship between Safety and Security
• Both involve threats
• Both are negative requirements
• Both are system qualities
• Both may require high levels of assurance
Are they the same?
advertent vs. inadvertent actions
BASIC SYSTEM SAFETY PRINCIPLES
• What is System Safety?
• System Safety Analysis Techniques
]b
SYSTEM SAFETY ENGINEERING
The application of scientific, management, and engineering principles
to ensure adequate safety within the constraints of operational
effectiveness, time, and cost throughout the system life cycle.
HAZARD ANALYSIS
• Identify hazards
• Assess risk
HAZARD CONTROL
• Eliminate hazards
• Minimize hazard occurrence or effects
Document and track hazards and progress made toward resolu-
tion of associated risk.
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Preliminary Hazard A nalyni_ (PHA):
• identifysafety-criticalreas and functions
• identify and evaluate hazards in terms of severity and likelihood
• identifysafety design criteriato be used
Results used in:
developing system safetyrequirements
preparing performance and design specifications
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MIL-STD-882B. System Safety Program
Requirements:
Category I.Catastrophic: may cause
death or system loss.
Category If.Critical:may cause severe
injury,severeoccupationalillness,or
major system damage.
Category Ill.Marginal:may cause minor
injury,minor occupational illness,or
minor system damage.
Category IV. Negligible:willnot result
in injury,occupationalillness,or sys-
tem damage.
NHB 5300.4 (1.D.1), a NASA document:
Category I. Loss of life or vehicle (in-
eludes loss or injury to public).
Category 2. Loss of mission (includes
both postlaunch abort and launch de-
lay sufficient to cause mission scrub).
Category 3. All others.
DOE 5481.1 (nuclear):
Low. Hazards that present minor on-site
and negligible off-site impacts to peo-
ple or the environment.
Moderate. Hazards that present consid-
erable potential on-site impacts to peo-
ple or environment, but at most only
minor off-site impacts.
High. Hazards with potential for major
on-site or off-site impacts to people or
the enviromment.
HAZARD PROBABILITY
Described in terms of occurrences per unit of time, events, popu-
lation, items, or activity.
Derive from modelling or from historical safety data from similar
systems.
Subsystem Hazard A naluaia (SSHAj/:
Identify hazards z_ociat_ with design of subsystems including:
component failure model
criticalerroneous human inputs
hazards resultingfrom functionalrelationshipsbetween
components of the subsystem
Determine how operating or failure modes of components affects
safety of the system.
Identify necessary actions to determine how to eliminate or
reduce riskof identified_ h_z4f¢is.
r
Evaluate design with respect to safety requirements of subsystem
specification.
System Hazard Ana!.ysiJ (SHA):
@ Identify ha_k_rdscreated by interfacesbetween subsystems or by
system operating as a whole including human errors.
• Examines allsubsystem interfacesfor
(a) compliance with safety criteriain system requirements
specification.
(b) possiblecombinations of independent, dependent, and
simultaneous hazardous events or failures,including
failuresof controlsand safety devices,that could
cause hazards.
(c)degradation of safety of system from normal operation of
system and subsystems.
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Operating and Supp.ort Hazard Analysis (OSHA):
identify hazards and risk reduction procedures during all phases
of system use and maintenance.
• especiallyexamines hazards created by man/machine interface.
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ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
Design reviews and walkthroughs
Checklists
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Event Tree Analyb';_(or Incident Sequence Analysis)
Hazard and OperabilityStudies (HAZOP)
Random Number Simulation Analysis (RNSA)
Failure Modes and E_ects Analysis (FMEA)
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SYSTEM SAFETY DESIGN PROCEDURES
GOAL: Eliminate identifiedhazards or, ifnot possible,reduce associ-
ated riskto an acceptable level.
Order of precedence forapplying safety design techniques:
(1) Intrinsicallysafedesign
(2) Prevent or minimize occurrence of hazards.
e.li._onitori_g
automatic control(automatic pressure reliefvMves,
speed governors,limit-levelsensing controls)
lockouts
Iockins
interlocks
(3) Control hazard ifitoccurs using automatic safety devices.
detection of hazards
fail-safe designs
damage control
containment
isolation of hazards
(4) Provide warning devices, procedures, and training to help person-
nel react to hazard.
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Figure IV-2. The OR-Gate
It is important to understand that causality never passes through an OR-gate. That
is, for an OR-gate, the input faults are never the causes of the output fault. Inputs to
an OR-gate are identical to the output but are more specifically defined as to cause.
Figure IV-3 helps to clarify this point.
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ERROR
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Figure IV-3. Specific Example of the OR-Gate
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Figure IV-5. The AND-Gate
In contrast to the OR-gate the AND-gate does specify a causal relationship
between the inputs and the output, i.e., the input faults collectively represent the
cause of the output fault. The AND-gate implies nothing whatsoever about the
"ecedents of the input faults. An example of an AND-gate is shown in Figure IV-6.
A failure of both diesel generators and of the battery will result in a failure of all
onsite DC power.
DIESEL
GENERATOR 1
IS FAILED
ALL ONSITE
DC POWER IS
FAILED ]
OIESEL
GENERATOR 2
IS FAILED
BATTERY
IS FAILEO
Figure IV-6. Specific l-xample of an AND-Gate
Quantitative modelling using fault trees:
• Attach probabilities to nodes of tree.
• Use boolean algebra to calculate minimal cut sets.
minimal cut set: All unique combinations of events
that can cause the top-level event.
A Sample Software Safety Program
• Software Development Management Responsibilities
• Software Hazard Analysis
• Establishing Software Safety Requirements
• Software Safety Requirements Review
• Software Safety Design Concepts
• Software Design and Recovery Analysis
* Software Safety Design Review
• Code Verification and Validation
• Assessment of Risk
, .1.1 t,
Software Safet_c involves ensuring that the software will execute
within a system context without resultingin unacceptable risk.
Risk is defined in terms of hazard_ -- states of the system that when
combined with certain environmental conditions could lead to a
mishap.
Risk -- f ( Pr [hazardoccurs],Pr [hazard leads to mishap],
Severityof worst potential mishap)
Safety critical software: software which can directly or indirectly
cause or allow a hazardous system state to exist.
GENERAL COMMENTS
@ Safety must be specifiedand designed into software from the
beginning.
Effective safety programs require changes throughout entire
software life cycle.
• Enhancing reliabilityisnot enough.
Th_ success of any software safety efforthinges on the abilityof
software, system, and safety engineers to cooperate and work
together.
Basic approach adapted from system safety engineering
1) Identify potential software-related hazards
2) Control hazards
Analysis
Start from hazard and work backward
to see if and how could occur.
• Design
Passive Control
Active Control
3c9
Philosophy and Goals
Building a bridge between software engineering and system
engineering.
• Use modeling and analysis for understanding and predic-
tion
A systems approach
hardware engineers,
assurance groups.
-- well-defined interfaces with
systems engineers, and quality
Focus on failures with the most serious consequences
Layers of protection
-. 31
Layers of Protection
Software safety verification
and analysis
i
Design to protect against hazards
Human or hardware protection
external to computer
. 32.
• Integrate into usual software development process
Activitiespan the lifecycle.
Catch errors early
throughout development.
verification distributed
Information derived from early activities(modeling
and analysis)isused to drivethe designand coding.
• Combine formal and informalapproaches
Static analysis using formal proofs and structured
walkthroughs
Dynamic analysisto provide confidencein the models
and assumptions used in the staticanalysis.
33
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CAVEATS
• No magic potions
• Nothing is absolutely safe
• No techniques are perfect
• Risk elimination vs. risk displacement
• Nothing is safe under all conditions
35
MANAGEMENT
Management commitment to :afetlt i: the most crucial requirement
for achieving it.
degree of safety achieved is directly dependent upon emphasis
given to it.
@ goals of safety can be accomplished only with the support of
managemenl.
Need to:
• set policy and define goals for software safety
• delegate responsibility
• grant authority
• fix accountability
@ clearly delineate lines of authority, cooperation, and administra-
tion
3_
General responsibilitiesof software safety management and personnel:
• Participationin early planning of the safetyprogram
Continual close interactionwith system safety group during the
lifeof the program
Participationin allaspects of the software development activities
to ensure that software hazards are eliminated or controlledto an
acceptable level.
• 37
software-related
hazards
software-safety
constraints
software
uirements
high-level design
design constraints
low-leveldesign
code constraints
code
Software Hazard Analysis
• Model the software/system interface
• Analysis to identify software-related hazards
• Integrate with system safety analysis
engineering models and analysis.
and system
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SOFTWARE HAZARD ANALYSIS
1) If operates "correctly," will any hazardous states result?
2) If there are failures, will hazards result?
Single failures?
Multiple failures?
Fault Tr_e Analysis
A graphic model of the various paralleland sequential combina-
tions of faults(or system states)that willresultin the occurrence
of a predefined undesired event.
Events can involve hardware failures, human mistakes, software
design faults, computer hardware failures, etc.
Start with list of system hazards (PHA). Assume hazard has
occurred, and work backward to determine set of possible causes.
Preconditions described with either AND or OR relationships.
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PETRI NET MODELS
Have developed analysis procedures to:
O identify hazards and safety-critical single and multiple
failure sequences
determine software safety requirements including timing
requirements
• analyze the design for safety and fault tolerance
guide in the use of failure detection and recovery pro-
cedures
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ecritical state: path to high-risk and possibly low-risk states as
well as path to only low-risk states.
Algorithm:
Start with high-risk states. Generate those one step back and see
if can go forward from them (Look forward one).
Work back to first potential critical state (state with two succes-
sors) and eliminate bad path.
• What if state not really reachable?
• What if not really a critical state?
• How do we know what states to start with. i.e. what about miscel-
laneous conditions?
_5
Modify design to disallow traversal of undesired path
change design- e.g. add interlocks, lockouts, etc.
r .
• add timing constraints
t 1
t 7
Fizure 4c. A Petri Net Graph with an Interlock (I)
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F_|ure 4d
Reachability Graph for F;zure 4c
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Time Petri Nets
Add two times to each transition:
minimum required enabling time
maximum time before transition must fire
Adding time makes analysis more difficult, but since
interested in worst case behavior:
1) Derive non-time teachability graph
2) Then use this to determine timing requirements
_g
Adding Failures to the Analysis
Types of control failures:
a required event that does not occur
an undesired event
an incorrect sequence of required events
two incompatible events occurring simultaneously
timing failures in event sequences
exceeding ma.,dmum time constraints between events
failing to ensure minimum time constraints between events
durationaI failures
49
tI
Figure 5a.Desired Event tI Does Not Occur
tI
Figure5b. Undesired Event t1 Occurs
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Important safety properties of a design:
Recoverable
Fault Tolerant
Fail Safe
faulty state: every path to it from the initial state contains a failure
transition.
Recoverable: after the occurrence of a failure, the control of the pro-
cess is not lost, and in an acceptable amount of time, it will return to
normal execution.
1) the number of faulty states is finite
2) there _are no terminal faulty states
3) there are no directed loops containing only faulty states
4) the sum of the max times on all paths from the failure transition
to a correct state is less than a predefined acceptable amount of
time.
correct behatnor path: a path in the failure reachability graph from
the initial st:__e to a final state which con*ains no failure transitions.
Fault Tolerant Process:
l) a correct behavior path isa subs,_.quenceof every path from the
initialstate to any terminal state.
2) the sum of the maximum times on allpaths is lessthan a pre-
defined acceptable amount of time.
Fail-Safe: allpaths from a failureF contain only low-riskstates.
,53
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Included in Mil-Std-882B (System Safety) and AF Hand-
book on Software Safety
• Used experimentally on some real projects
Never meant to be practical -- changing to a better
model.
•" 5_,
External Interaction Model
Goal is to interface between system engineering and software
engineering.
EIM includes the software behavior and assumptions about
the behavior of the environment within which the software
will operate.
(
Uses:
• To verify system correctness (software requirements
satisfy system requirements) including satisfying con-
straints.
To minimize effects of system requirements and design
changes on software through appropriate design.
To determine and specify
software to violations of
(robustness).
appropriate
environmental
responses by
assumptions
Cannot just "scale-up" techniques for specifying interface
between software components.
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Can use model to determine whether the components
(including the software) of the larger system working
together exhibit certain properties.
Partial responsibility for ensuring some properties
may be assigned to software.
Their existence may be affected by behavior of
software.
Static analysis of properties vs. dynamic control during exe-
cution
In both cases, must prepare system under develop-
ment, systematically from the outset, to satisfy them.
Safety is an emergent or non-hierarchical property.
Appears only when system components considered as
a whole not in individual components.
Accidents most often occur in the interfaces of sys-
tems- a consequence of undesired and unhandled
interactions between components.
C
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Statecharts:
• extension of finite-state machines to include:
hierarchy
modularity
orthogonality
generalized transitions
• Provides graphical language with rigorous semantics.
• But doesn't have:
communication other than broadcast
straightforward notation for assigning
attributes to inputs and outputs
probabilities
analysis techniques defined on it.
Use Statecharts to describe state information of all com-
ponents and add:
1) Input and output exchange declarations
input exchange chart:
value(Y) E ValuRange(Y)
time(Y) e TimeRange(Y)
timetype(Y) E (continual, periodic, S-R}
source(Y) e C
capacity
exceptions
output exchange chart:
v.alue(X) e ValuRange(X)
time(X) E TimeRange(X)
timetype(X) E {continual, periodic, S-R}
destination(X) E C
load
2) Rules and mappings for these exchanges
Make explicit the assumptions and allowed interactions
according to given, implied, and derived constraints.
Static checking for inconsistencies between matched
exchanges
Source for dynamic checking of inconsistencies between
real state of environment and computer model of it.
nal
As external state changes, inputs provide current
status and feedback information to update inter-
model.
Two types of safety analysis defined on EIM model:
Safety analysis assuming no failures- provide confidence
that if system performs as specified, will not reach a
hazardous state.
backwards reachability analysis based on
critical states
Analysis with failure -- fault tree analysis generated
directly from model's state representation.
Determine erroneous software states that can
lead to system hazards.
TESTBED:
TCAS II: Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System
Family of airborne devices functioning independently
of the ground-based ATC system.
Provides traffic advisories to assist pilot in avoiding
intruder aircraft.
Provides resolution advisories (recommended escape
maneuvers) in a vertical direction to avoid conflicting
traffic.
Communicates with intruder aircraft TCAS systems,
transponders on intruder aircraft, pilot, and ground-
based radar beacon system.
Used by airline aircraft and larger commuter and
business aircraft.
We will provide a system requirements specification
and a safety analysis of the specification.
_3
ESTABLISHING SOFTWARE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS
Goal: Rewriting software hazards identified by the SHA as software
requirements
Need to consider:
• what system shall not do
means for eliminating and controlling damage is case of an
accident
,ways in which software can failsafelyand to what extent failure
istolerable.
L#
SOFTWARE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS REVIEW
Goal: identify critical requirements, missing requirements, require
ments that may conflict with safety.
Participants: software engineers
system engineers
applicationengineers
safetyel;gineers
Results used to: improve software requirements specification
update Software Hazards List
update detailed safety design criteria
test and evaluation criteria
Techniques: Ad hoc techniques
Real Time Logic
•. 65
software-related
hazards
software-safety
constraints
software
uirements
I design constraints
code constraints
high-leveldesign
low-level design
code
Requirements Analysis:
AnMyze softwsre requirements for robustness,lack of
ambiguity, consistencywith system requirements
• Verify consistency with safety constrs/nts.
• Identify conflicts and tradeoffs.
What is Correctness?
A system is a set of component working together to achieve
some common objective or function.
Three components of system requirements:
1) Basic function or objective
2) Constraints on operating conditions
Define range of conditions within which system may
operate while achieving its objective.
Limit the set of acceptable designs.
Arise from several sources:
quality considerations
physical limitations onequipment
process characteristics
safety considerations
3) Prioritized quality goals to:
Judge which alternative design is best
Resolve tradeoffs between conflicting requirements.
Two aspects of specification correctness:
• Implementation correctness
Constructed component
specification.
satisfies its requirements
Specification must distinguish behavior of desired
software from any other, undesired program that
might be designed.
Requires specification to be sufficiently unambiguous.
( • System correctness
Component behavior, if implementation satisfies its
requirements, together with specified behavior of the
other components will satisfy the system require-
ments.
(
Approaches to finding errors in requirements specifications:
• Prototyping
• Executable specifications
• Scenarios
• . Informal reviews
• Formal modeling and analysis
Build model of software behavior and its interface
with other components and analyze to ensure
behavior and properties of model match desired
behavior and properties.
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Figure I: The control loop
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The RSM is denoted as a seven-tuple (E, Q, qo, Pr, Po, _, _t) where:
• IE is the set of input/output variables, Z and O,
• Q is the set of states of the control component C.
• q0 E Q is the initial state of C; the software is in this state before startup.
• PT is the set predicates on the values and timing of the inputs (Z). They t
state change in the RSM.
• Po is the set of predicates on the outputs (0)
• 6 is the state transition function Q x PT to Q.
( is the trigger-to-output relationship Q × PT to Po.
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The Startup Sequence.
39 O_tG!N/_I. PAGE'_fS
JInput/output Variables
States {_ / _0
Startup and Shutdown
Modes
Trigger Predicates
Tautology Requirements
Essential Value Assumptions
Essential Timing Assumptions
Properly bounded ranges
Capacity and load
Mimimum arrival rates, etc.
_5
Criterion 6.1 Every state must have a behavior (transition) defined for
every possible input. Formally,
VI, q3q,,p : (6(q,p) = ql) A (p E PTt)
where I E E, q, ql E Q and Prt is defined as in section 4.
Criterion 6.2 The logical OR (v) of the input predicates on the transitions
out of any state must form a tautology:
where the p,s are the input predicates leading out of the state
of interest.
Criterion 6.3 Every state must have a behavior (transition) defined in case
there is no input for a given period of time, i.e., a timeout.
Criterion 6.4 The RSM must to be deterministic.Let pi representthe
input predicateon the ith transitionout of a state.Then
deterministicbehaviorisguaranteed by:
ViVj (i # j) =_ "(Pi A pj )
@@
Output Predicates _o
Environmental capacity considerations
Data Age
Latency
Trigger-to-Output Relationship
Graceful Degradation
Hysteresis
l_esponsiveness an.d Spontaneity (Feedback)
77
$ Transitions _"
Basic lteachability
Recurrent Behavior
Reversibility
Reachability of Safe States
Path Robustness
Constraint Analysis
Criterion 9.3 Reversibility of an operation z (performed in a state q,) by
an operation y (performed in a state q E Q_) required a path
between q= and a state belonging to Q_. Formally,
3q3s: s) = q) ^
where q E Qy.
R.s_uarMf65
Criterion 9.5 Soft and hard-failuremodes should be eliminated for all
hazard-reducingoutputs. Formally,letQ, and Qv be the
setsof stateswhere actionsz and y are performed. The loss
of the abilityto receive/ isa soft-failuremode forthe paths
from action z to action y if["
3qVql, s[(_(q,s) = q,) =_ (-_@(s,)V IT)]
where q E Q, and ql E Q_.
The loss of the ability to receive I is a hard-failure mode if['
VqVql, s[(6(q,s) = ql) =_ (",_b(s,) V I T)]
where q E Qs and ql E Qv.
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Future Goals:
• Extend criteria on RSM
• Define analysis procedures for the criteria
• Demonstrate by applying to TCAS
Transactions on Software Engineering, March 1991.
SAFE SOFTWARE DESIGN PRINCIPLES
• Preventing Hazards
• Detecting and Recovering from Hazards
• Example
Sl
SOFTWARE SAFETY DESIGN CONCEPTS
ALalysis and verification alone not enough because:
• techni,tues are error-prone
cost may be prohibitive
elimination of all hazards may require too severe a performance
penalty
Two general principles:
(1) design should provide leverage for certification efl't-rt
(2) avoi_ adding complexity
Two categories:
• . Prevention of hazards through software desi_
(tends toinvolve reduction of functionality or design freedom)
• Detection and tr_atment at run-time
(difficult and unreliable)
PREVENTING I_kZARDS THROUGH SOFTWARE DESIGN
General goals: make software intrinsicallysafeso that software faults
and failurescannot lead to system hazards.
General approach: reduce amount of software that affectssafetyand
change as many potentiallycriticalfault__nto non-criticalfaultsas
possible.
• Design to limitactionsof software
modularization
data access limitations
separate criticalfrom non-criticalfunctions
firewalls
hierarchicaldesign
• Authority limitationto protect criticalfunctions and data
• Minimize hazardous statesor time in them
Use software interlocksto ensure sequencing or prevent hazardous
outputs
• Protect against hardware failures
DETECTION AND TREATMENT AT RUN-TIME
Detection:
assertions
acceptance tests
external monitors
watchdog timers
voting
Mechanisms not as much_ of a problem as formulating the cl'.ecks
Recovery:
• Safety recovery routinesneeded when:
unsafe state detected externally
determined that software cannot provide required oatput
within a prescribed time limit
continuation of regular routine would lead to a hazard if
no intervention
Backward adequate ifcan be guaranteed that software faultswill
be detected and successfulrecovery completed before fault aff_:t
external state.
• Forward recovery usually alsoneeded
robust data structures
dynamic alterationof flow of control
reconfigUration
ignoring singlecycle errors
reduced function or fail-safemodes
• Design for a safe-side
Fail-Safe Design
Desiga system to have a safe-side: state that is always reachable
from any other state and that is always safe.
• Often has performance penalties.
@ Besides shutting down, may need to take some action to avoid
harm.
• Safety system itself may cause harm.
May be intermediate safe states with limited functionality, espe-
dally in systems where shutdown itself would be hazardous.
• Reeonfiguration or _iynamic alteration of control is a form of par-
tial shutdown.
2 level structure:
TOP LEVEL
less important governing functions
supervisory, coordination, management functions
separate processor
loss cannot endanger turbine nor cause it to shutdown
BASE LEVEL
secure software core that can detect significant
failures of hardware
self checks of:
sensibility of incoming signals
whether processor functioning correctly
failure of self-check leads to reversion to safe
state through fail-safe hardware.
_7
No interrupts except for fatal store fault (nonmaskable)
-- timing and sequencing defined
-- more rigorous and exhaustive testing
Uses polling
all messages unidirectional
--- no recovery or contention protocols required
--. higher level of predictability
State table defines:
scheduling of tasks
self-check criteria appropriate under particular conditions
t
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SOFTWARE DESIGN AND RECOVERY ANALYSIS
Two goals:
(1) Identify safety-critical items.
(2) Identify self-test, fault-tolerance, _ud fail-safe facilities needed for
safety-critical items.
Sa/ttlt- Critical Ittms:
software processes, data items, or states whose inadvertent
occurrence, failure to occur when required, occurrence out of
sequence, occurrence in combination with other functions, or
erroneous value can be involved in development of a hazard.
Includes erroneous program states and data items that could
cause a hazard even iffunction or algorithm iscorrect.
Identify through backward flow analysis on top-level design to
locate critical paths and data.
a,4vual procedures
Software Fault Tree Analysis
Uses Hierarchy
• Used for:
feedback to software and system design
e.g. minimizing critical items
isolating critical items
designing fault tolerance facilities
planning load shedding and reconfiguration
Recovery Analysis
Evaluate software and hardware failures for potential effect on
safety-critical items.
identify self-test, fault-tolerance, and faii-Lxfe facilities needed for
critical items.
Results:
• Identification of assumptions about failures and undesired events
Fault-tolerance and fail-safe guidelines for rest of software
development
• Evaluation of safety design requirements
Description of planned safety aspects of the design including
prevention_detect.ion, and treatment of hazards.
Evaluation of planned safety aspects of design including fault
detection and recovery facilities planned for each critical item.
SOFTWARE SAFETY DESIGN REVIEW
As part of regular design review:
(1) verify that safety requirements implemented iu detailed design
(2) verify that software safety desip criteria and fault tolerance
guidelines implemented in design
(3) produce a final safety test recommendations report.
VERIFICATION OF SAFETY
• What is it?
• Software Fault Tree Analysis
_3
CODE VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
If rest of program followed, need for most costly procedures will
be minimized.
Walkthroughs and formal verification (e.g. Software Fault Tree
Analysis) needed only on modules determined to be so critical
that testing or other assurance procedures alone will not suffice to
ensure acceptable risk.
Need to verify that detailed feature related to safety-critical items
and fault-tolerance facilities have been correctly implemented.
Need to verify that assumptions and models upon which analyses
have been based are correct.
lteri_i ¢a_to_o or9
_tS.
Software Fault Tree Analysis
A symbolic logic diagram which shows
relationship (AND or OR) between an
and one or more contributory causes.
cause and effect
undesired event
• A Systems Tool
• Related to formal axiomatic program verification BUT:
specification derived from system requirements
include consideration of hardware failures,
environmental conditions, human errors
proof by contradiction
q_
(1) A := ,r(y); (2) B :ffi X- 5.0; (3) if A > B then Sub1; end if;
Figure 8: Sample Assignment Statements
SublcaUed[
I
caused A
I. (1) caus_ /F(Y) > X- 5.0
Figure g: Fault Tree for Assigrm_ent St_tement_
procedure call
caused the event
lparamecer values I procedure failinz J¢,_ the event] _,_._dthe _ent !
Figure I0: Fault Tree for a Procedure Call
j 1
then part 1caused event
i
else part !:aused event
,.I., I f L I
I cond. true ] ! then-par_ [ [ cond. f_C_ e_e-,_
I pfior to IF • caused event . toI
Figure 11: Fault Tree for an-If-Then-Eke Statement
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event caused by
while statement
I statement [
not executedJ
event prior
to while
i
cond. false }bdore while
cond. true
bet'ore while
l
statement ]executed N times
I
J [Nth iteration
eauzes event
Figure 12: Fault Tree for a Wh_le Statement
!
event caused by I
cue statement }
I
cond. 1
true
Iwhen clause 1 Iwhen clause n
I I I F
I
else part ]
caused event I
Figure 13: Fault Tree for a C_e Statement
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Software faulttreehas two possiblepatterns:
(1) A contradiction is found.
(2) Fault tree runs through code and out to controlled system or its
environment.
.. Ioo
FIREWHEEL Example
Used SFTA to analyze the flight and telemetry program for a U.C.
Berkeley spacecraft.
• Mission: to sample electric fields in the earth's magnetotail.
• Critical Failure Event: ripping wire booms off spacecraft.
Cost: needed to examine 12% of code (out of approximately 300
lines of Pascal code), took two man days
Results: A criticalscenario detected that was undiscovered dur-
ing a thorough testand evaluationby an independent group.
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Software Fault Tree Analysis useful to:
identify software faults potentially leading to accidents
OR "verify" (increase confidence) they do not exist
• provide information for testing
• provide guidance for content and placement of run-time
assertions (fault detection)
provide information on fail-safe requirements
u
.. Io5
ASSESSMENT OF RISK
Certificationof system partly based on system safetyreport including
• De._criptionof procedures used to ensur_ig software safety
• Results of software analyses
• Quantification of risk.
I t)b
Physical devices vs. software
• They "fail" differently: failure vs. design errors
No historical reliability and safety assessments on stan-
dard designs for software.
Repair involves redesign rather than replacement by
equivalent part.
(
q[
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Software Reliability Models
Estimation of reliability model parameters made from
measurements of time between failures during testing.
Most of controversy rests on assumptions models make
about software. Some typical ones:
-- Software faults, and thus the failures they may cause,
are independent of each other.
Inputs for software are selected randomly from an
input space.
Test-input space is representative of the operational
input space.
Software under test constitutes a functional unit to
which no new software modules are added during test-
ing.
Each software failure is observed.
-- Faults are corrected without introducing new ones.
-- All errors are of equal severity.
-- Each fault contributes equally to the failure rate.
-- No major revisions or changes in staffing or aspects of
development or maintenance environment.
/a!
Even if believe models, cannot exercise enough during
testing to provide very low failure probabilities with high
confidence.
Doug Miller:
To assure failure rate less than 10 -9 failures/hour,
must test for more than 109 hours and experience no
failures (110,000 years of testing).
To be 99% confident that failure probability less than
10 -9 requires 4.6 x 109 test cases without failure
(525,000 years of testing if unit of time hours and
assume reasonable amount of time to execute a test
case).
Io?
CONCLUSIONS
Standard reliability and fault tolerance techniques will not solve
the safety problem for the present.
• A new attitude required:
Looking at what you do not want software to do along with
what you want it to do.
Assumi'ng things will go wrong.
New procedures and changes to entire software development pro-
cess will be necessary.
Special software safety analysis techniques are needed.
Design techniques, especially eliminating complexity, will
help.
FIREWHEEL Example
Used SFTA to analyze the flight and telemetry program for a U.C.
Berkeley spacecraft.
• Mission: to sample electric fields in the earth's magnetotail.
• Critical Failure Event: ripping wire booms off spacecraft.
Cost: needed to examine 12% Of code (out of approximately 300
lines of Pascal code), took two man days
Results: A critical scenario detected that was undiscovered dur-
ing a thorough test and evaluation by an independent group.
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Software Fault Tree Analysis useful to:
• identify software faults potentially leading to accidents
OR "verify" (increase confidence) they do not exist
• provide information for testing
provide guidance for content and placement of run-time
assertions (fault detection)
• provide information on fail-safe requirements
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ASSESSMENT OF RISK
Certificationof system partly based on system safety reportincluding
• De._criptionof proceduree used to ensur_ software safety
• Results of software analyses
• Quantificationof risk.
ORIGINAL PAGE IS
OF POO_ qUALm,
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Physical devices vs. software
• They "fail" differently: failure vs. design errors
No historical reliability and safety assessments on stan-
dard designs for software.
Repair involves redesign rather than replacement by
equivalent part.
(
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Software Reliability Models
Estimation of reliability model parameters made from
measurements of time between failures during testing.
Most of controversy rests on assumptions models make
about software. Some typical ones:
Software faults, and thus the failures they may cause,
are independent of each other.
Inputs for software are selected randomly from an
input space.
Test-input space is representative of the operational
input space.
Software under test constitutes a functional unit to
which no new software modules are added during test-
ing.
Each software failure is observed.
Faults are corrected without introducing new ones.
r
All errors are of equal severity.
Each fault contributes equally to the failure rate.
w No major revisions or changes in staffing or aspects of
development or maintenance environment.
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Even if believe models, cannot exercise enough during
testing to provide very low failure probabilities with high
confidence.
Doug Miller:
To assure failure rate less than 10 -9 failures/hour,
must test for more than 109 hours and experience no
failures (110,000 years of testing).
To be 99% confident that failure probability less than
10 -9 requires 4.6 x 109 test cases without failure
(525,000 years of testing if unit of time hours and
assume reasonable amount of time to execute a test
case).
CONCLUSIONS
Standard reliabihty and fault tolerance techniques will not solve
the safety problem for the present.
• A new attitude required:
Looking at what you do not want software to do along with
what you want it to do.
Assuming things will go wrong.
New procedures and changes to entire software development pro-
cess will be necessary.
Special software safety analysis techniques are needed.
Design techniques, especially ehminating complexity, will
help.
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